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the suspect of the dangerous consequences of remaining silent. The right to
remain silent at the time of arrest must be a hollow one if adverse inferences
can later be drawn from it. The decision in Graham also tells us one more
thing. It will be remembered that Graham said he might make a statement if
he could first get in touch with his lawyer. Although he later changed his mind,
it was by that time -toolate - the "res gestae period" had expired. So although
a suspect may insist on being allowed to seek advice from a lawyer before
being subjected to a breathalizer test,127 no such generosity is shown to a
suspect waiting to make his exculpatory statement!
Anthony Hooper*
*Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University.
127 R. v. Brownridge (1972), 28 D.L.R. (3d) 1 (S.C. of Can.).

Re McCreath
SUCCESSION DUTY -

TRUST

Inter Vivos -

INTEREST RESERVED BY SETTLOR

-EXEMPT

The Province of Ontario has not found it a simple matter to levy death
duties. Throughout the first forty-seven years of its operation the Succession
Duty Act was open to attack on constitutional grounds. Despite numerous
amendments in the years between 1892 and 1937 it was not until the latter year
that the charging section assumed an appearance which remotely resembled
the present provisions of section 6.1 Further but less substantial amendments
were required in 1939 and 1940. Since 1940, although other parts of the
statute have been affected by a long series of amendments, the basic structure
of the Succession Duty Act has not changed. Duty is imposed upon property
which is situate in Ontario if that property passes on the death of a person. 2
In addition, persons resident or domiciled in Ontario are subjected to duty if
foreign personalty passed to them on the death of a person domiciled in
Ontario. 3 The duty is also imposed upon residents who, under dispositions
made in Ontario, have received either property situate within the Province or
foreign personalty.4 Finally, persons resident in Ontario at the date of the
death of a person domiciled in Ontario, are subject to duty if they have
IS.O. 1937, c. 3, s. 7.
2 R.S.O. 1970, c. 449, s. 6(a).
3 Id., s. 6(b).
4 Id., s. 6(c).
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received foreign personalty under dispositions made outside of Ontario and
if they were resident and the
deceased was domiciled in Ontario at the date
5
of the particular disposition.
That the statute has grown into such a complex and convoluted piece of
legislation seems to have been due in part to the difficulty which was experienced in simultaneously retaining provisions which were over-enthusiastically
borrowed from the Estate Tax legislation in force in the United Kingdom,
retaining a wide tax base and remaining within the limits allowed by the British
North America Act, 1867. In view of this difficulty and the effect it had
produced upon the legislation by 1940, it is, perhaps, not surprising that the
tendency since that year has been merely to add rather than to integrate subsequent amendments into the statute.
The appointment of the Langford Committee6 in 1972 has raised hopes
that reform, if not repeal, of the legislation may be in the offing. Persons who
hold such sentiments will be encouraged by the recent decision of Fraser J.
7
in Re McCreath.
The Decision in Re McCreath
Almost 20 years before her death the deceased had transferred shares in
a company to a trustee upon the following trusts:
(a) During the lifetime of the settlor to pay or apply the whole net income of the
trust fund in each year to or for the benefit of the settlor and her issue from
time to time alive or some one or more of the settlor and her said issue as the
trustee may from time to time in its absolute discretion determine and if paid
or applied to or for the benefit of more than one of them to pay or apply the
same in such proportions as the trustee may from time to time in its absolute
discretion determine.
(b) On the death of the settlor, if she shall die leaving issue her surviving, to hold
the trust fund in trust for the issue of the settlor or such one or more of them
and in such proportions and subject to such terms and conditions as the settlor
may by will direct and in default of such direction or insofar as the same may
be void or shall not extend or take effect to pay or transfer the trust fund to
the issue of the settlor who shall be living at her death and if more than one
in equal shares per stirpes.

After the deceased died in 1968 without having exercised her testamentary power of appointment, the Minister of Revenue for Ontario included
the value of the corpus of the trust within the aggregate value for the purposes
of succession duty. The deceased's children who were donees in default
of appointment and other beneficiaries under the deceased's will appealed to
the Supreme Court of Ontario.
The appellants argued first that the corpus of the trust was not property
passing on death within the terms of the general definition in the statute and
5 Id., s. 6(d).
6 The Advisory Committee on Succession Duties was established in June 1972 under
the Chairmanship of Mr. J. Alex Langford Q.C. The Committee's terms of reference
include the making of a comprehensive review and thorough examination of the Succession
Duty Act and the presentation of advice with respect to a revision of the Act.
7 [1973] 10.R. 771.
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that it did not fall within any of the special categories of property which is
deemed to pass on death. The second ground of appeal was that the trust fell
within the exemption conferred by section 5(l)(g) of the Act.
Fraser J.rejected the first of these arguments and held that the corpus
was deemed to pass on death under section l(r)(x) as
property passing under any past or future settlement, including any trust, . . .
made by deed or other instrument not taking effect as a will, whereby an interest
in such property or the proceeds of sale thereof for life, or any other period
determinable by reference to death, is reserved either expressly or by implication
to the settlor, ....8

In giving his reasons for this part of the decision, the learned Judge considered at some length whether the deceased could be regarded as having
reserved an interest within the meaning of the provision. Two decisions on
the meaning of an almost identical provision in revenue legislation of the
United Kingdom supported an affirmative conclusion. 9 In a more recent
decision, Gartside and Another v. I.R.C.,10 the House of Lords had held that
the objects of a discretionary trust which contained a power to accumulate
income did not have any "interest" within the meaning of a statutory provision
which deemed property to pass on death if, inter alia, "an interest limited to
cease on a death has been disposed of or has determined, ... after becoming
an interest in possession, ... ".11 The House of Lords refused to over-rule
the earlier decisions and distinguished them mainly on the ground that the
mischief at which the provisions analogous to section 1(r)(x) of the Ontario
Act were directed required the application of a broader conception of an
interest.
In Re McCreath, Fraser J. placed some weight also on dicta which
emphasized the fact that the trust in Gartsidewas "non-exhaustive": that the
trustees were, in other words, entitled to accumulate income and could not
be compelled to make a distribution.
In the case at Bar the donees of the income are entitled collectively to the payment
of the whole thereof. The settlor is one of those donees. In the provisions of
[section 1(r)(x)] the word "interest" is not qualified by "in possession" or words
of a like import. I am of opinion that in principle and applying the reasoning in
the cases to which I have referred, that the settlor did have an interest in the
income from the 1948 trust and it therefore falls within the definition of property
passing on death found in [section l(r)(x)]. 12

The learned Judge then turned to the second ground of appeal and the
argument that the trust constituted a disposition which was exempt under
section 5(l)(g) of the Succession Duty Act. That provision reads as follows:
No duty shall be levied on any of the following property nor on any person to
whom there are any transmissions of any of the following property, with respect
sThe remaining part of the provision deals with powers to revoke the settlement
or to resettle property in the settlement.
9A.-G. v. Heywood (1887), 19 Q.B.D. 326; A.-G. v. Farrell, [1931] 1 K.B. 81.

10 [1968] A.C. 553 (H.L.).
11 FinanceAct, 1940, s. 43(1).
12 Supra, note 7, at 785. per Fraser, J. In subsequent English decisions this distinction

has been rejected, see text, infra at p. 324.
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to such transmissions, or on any person to whom any of the following dispositions
are made, with respect to such dispositions, and such property and dispositions shall
not be included in the aggregate value nor included for the purpose of determining
any rate of duty,... (g) any disposition where actual and bona fide enjoyment and
possession of the property in respect of which the disposition is made, was assumed
more than five years before the date of death of the deceased by the person to whom
the disposition is made, or by a trustee for such person, and thenceforth retained
to the entire exclusion of the deceased or of any benefit to him whether voluntary
or by contract or otherwise;

As in the opinion of the learned Judge the trust fell within the terms of the
statutory definition of a disposition and as it was created more than five years
before the date of the settlor's death, the crucial question was whether, within
the five year period, bona fide possession and enjoyment of the property was
retained to the entire exclusion of the deceased or of any benefit to him. The
answer to the question was held to depend upon the correct identification
of the property which was the subject matter of the disposition. To assist in
this identification the learned Judge referred to decisions of English and Irish
Courts, the Privy Council and the Supreme Court of Canada.
The English and Irish decisions 13 turned on the interpretation of the
provision of the FinanceAct, 1894 on which the draftsman of section 5(l)0g)
had obviously relied. The Privy Council decisions 14 turned on provisions in
Australian legislation which were, in all relevant respects, identical to those
considered in the English and Irish cases. In the Canadian case, M.N.R. v.
National Trust Company Limited (Wood Estate),15 the Supreme Court of
Canada, on the basis of a provision virtually identical to section 5(1)(g),
upheld an appeal against an assessment under the Dominion Succession Duty
Act.

The reasoning in these prior decisions suggests that, for the purposes of
provisions, of the kind contained in section 5(l)(g), the subject matter of a
disposition consists of the beneficial property rights which the disposition
confers upon its recipients. Beneficial property interests which are retained
by the maker of the disposition are not part of the subject matter.
In Re McCreath this reasoning was followed. The subject matter of the
disposition was identified as the equitable remainder in the corpus of the trust
and, as the deceased had been excluded from this equitable remainder interest,
the trust was held to be exempt. The fact that she might under the terms of
the trust, and did in fact, share in the income was of no significance as the
gift of the corpus was "clearly severable from the gift of the income". 16
13

Re Cochrane, [1905] 2 I.R. 626; af'd., [1906] 2 I.R. 200 (C.A.); St. Aubyn v.

A.-G., [1952] A.C. 15 (I.L.).
14

Commissionerof Stamp Duties of New South Wales v. PerpetualTrustee Co. Ltd.,

[1943] A.C. 425 (P.C.); Oakes v. Commissioner of Stamp Duties of New South Wales,
[1954] A.C. 57 (P.C.); Chick v. Commissioner of Stamp Duties of New South Wales,

[1958] A.C. 435 (P.C.).
15 [1949] S.C.R. 127.
16 Supra, note 7, at 795.

320

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL.

11, NO. 2

Critique
The implications of the decision are remarkable. No attempt to impose
death taxes could possibly be effective if it was directed solely at the testamentary estate. The draftsmen of statutes which impose such taxes invariably
seek to bring within the statutory net a variety of inter vivos dispositions
which might otherwise be used to avoid the tax. The prime example of such
a disposition is surely the trust with a life interest reserved to the settlor. If the
reasoning in Re McCreath is correct the corpus of such a trust is exempt
from duty under the legislation in force in Ontario. This conclusion is so
startling that the reasoning of the learned Judge deserves careful scrutiny.
On reading the opinion there is at first an appearance of inevitability in
that reasoning. The terms of section 5(l)(g) are indeed similar to those of the
provisions which were considered in the earlier cases in other jurisdictions.
There is, however, one highly significant difference between the provisions
construed in the English, Irish and Australian cases and those on which the
decisions in Wood Estate and Re McCreath were based. The latter were
exempting provisions; the former were provisions which recaptured gifts if
the donor was not excluded from the property or from any benefit within the
statutory period. Whereas the approach in the English, Irish and Privy Council
decisions may be perfectly appropriate for the purposes of the Finance Act
and the Australian legislation, it is singularly inappropriate when the construction of the Succession Duty Act is in question.
It was recognized in the Supreme Court of Canada in Gorkin (Adilman
Estate) v. M.N.R.1 7 that when Parliament inserts a recapturing section in a
Succession Duty Act:
It must be assumed that it was placed there so as to include, as a succession, a certain
type of transaction which would not otherwise have been included under any of the
other paragraphs ....
18

It has been seen that section 1(r)(x) deems settlements with reserved
life interests to be property passing on death. That part of the provision
would be almost totally ineffective if the decision in Re McCreath were
correct. Where such a settlement was created more than five years before
the settlor's death, the corpus would normally be exempt under section 5(1)(g).
Where such a settlement was created within five years of the death it would
be recaptured under one of the provisions relating to dispositions unless the
requirements of those provisions with respect to the place of the disposition
and of the domicile or residence of the settlor and the recipient were not
satisfied. It is hardly a reasonable assumption that the sole purpose of section
l(r)(x) is to fill the lacunae in the other provisions which recapture dispositions
made within five years of death.
In two other respects the reasoning in Adilman Estate is of some relevance to the problem in Re McCreath. In the former case the Minister had,
in the Exchequer Court, relied successfully on a decision on the interpretation
of a provision of the Finance Act of the United Kingdom. That provision
17 [1962] S.C.R. 363.
18 Id., at 368, per Martland 1.
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created an exception to the obligation to pay tax. This factor was given some
emphasis in the Supreme Court's reasons for refusing to apply the decision
to a recapturing provision in the Dominion Succession Duty Act.' 9
The second point which is worthy of note is that the Court in Adilman
Estate adopted 20 the following statement of Lord Blanesburgh in Attorney
General for Ontario v. Perry:
First then, is the Ontario Sub-section, unlike the corresponding British Enactment,
an "original" section? In their Lordships' judgment it undoubtedly is, and must be

so construed. It contains on its face no reference to any origin. It comes into
Ontario legislation full-grown and without ancestry. It would, in their Lordships'

judgment, be contrary to all principle, for the purpose of construing it, to look at
the evolution even of the same enactment under some other system of law.21
The same point had been made at greater length by Judson J. delivering the
judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in Toronto General Trusts Corporation (Hilder Estate) v. M.N.R.
The Finance Act, 1894 imposed an estate duty not a succession duty. I have already
stated that the Canadian Act taxes a successor who becomes beneficially entitled
to property consequent upon a death. The English Act imposes a tax on property
passing on death or property deemed to pass on death... There is no possible
analogy between a duty imposed upon a successor when there is a change of beneficial ownership and an estate duty imposed on property passing or deemed to pass

on death. The two Acts differ so widely in structure and incidence of taxation that
cases decided on one Act are of little assistance to the interpretation of the other
and it is of no help that sections of one Act may have been copied from the other.
The Dominion Succession Duty Act must be construed independently and the
caution expressed in Attorney General for Ontariov. Perry ... against a consider-

ation of statutory origins and evolution as an aid to interpretation is particularly
appropriate here where the two Acts differ so fundamentally.22

The provision to which Lord Blanesburgh referred was, in fact a provision
almost identical to those construed in English and Australian cases which
were followed in Re McCreath. That provision has now been removed from
the Succession Duty Act of Ontario although as has been seen a virtually
identical provision now confers an exemption in section 5(l)(g) of the statute.
It would be very curious if the deletion of the recapturing provision and its
replacement with an exempting provision has had the effect of making applicable decisions which might formerly have been held to be inapplicable.
If, however, a case can be made for treating the decisions under
recapturing provisions as supplying no guidance for the interpretation of
section 5(1)(g), there remains the formidable obstacle raised by the reasoning
and decision of the Supreme Court in Wood Estate.23 The assessment under
appeal in that case had been made with respect to a trust created some ten
years prior to the settlor's death. Under the terms of the trust the settlor's
daughter was entitled to the annual income and was to receive the corpus on
the death of the settlor. It was also provided that in the event of her death in
19 Id., at 368, per Martland J.
20 Id.,

at 369, per Martland 1.
[19341 A.C. 477 at 487 (P.C.).
22 [1958] S.C.R. 499 at 505, per Judson J.
23 [1949] S.C.R. 127.
21
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the settlor's lifetime the corpus would revert to him. On the authority of the
Privy Council cases decided under the Australian legislation it was held in
both the Exchequer Court24 and the Supreme Court of Canada that the trust
fell within exempting provisions very similar in terms to those in section
5(1)(g) of the Succession Duty Act of Ontario. Moreover, as Fraser J.
emphasized in Re McCreath, the members of the Supreme Court of Canada
were unanimous in holding that the particular provision conferred an overriding exemption which had to be applied irrespective of the fact that the trust
fell within any one or more recapturing provisions of the Dominion Succession
Duty Act.
In the light of this reasoning and the attitude of the Supreme Court
towards the Privy Council decisions it cannot be said that the result in Re
McCreath is unsupported by persuasive authority. That is not to say that the
learned Judge was compelled to adopt an interpretation of section 5(1)(g)
which, to put it bluntly, makes nonsense of the recapturing provisions of the
statute. There are, it is submitted, grounds on which the decision of the
Supreme Court might well have been distinguished. At the relevant time the
Dominion Succession Duty Act contained both a recapturing and an exempting
provision with terms similar to those in section 5(l)(g). Despite the dicta
delivered in Adilman Estate and Hilder Estate it was obviously much easier
to regard the Privy Council decisions on similar recapturing provisions as
applicable in these circumstances. When the draftsman of the statute included
a provision almost identical in its terms and substantially similar in its purpose
to provisions in other jurisdictions it is not illegitmate at least to start from
the assumpton that the decisions from other jurisdictions have some persuasive
authority. It is not a long or unreasonable step to allow that assumption to
affect the interpretation of an exempting provision which is in virtually the
same terms.
The position under the Succession Duty Act of Ontario is quite different.
There, section 5(1)(g) has no converse in the recapturing or charging provisions. Its purpose is quite different from that of the provisions considered
by the Privy Council. It would seem that in such circumstances it would have
been quite proper for Fraser J. to consider the structure of the Act and the
consequences of alternative interpretation, to treat the decision of the Supreme
Court as distinguishable and to heed the warnings given in the later cases of
Adilman Estate and Hilder Estate.
Alternative Constructions
The above comments are not uncritical. They would, however, be quite
empty if it were not possible to give section 5(l)(g) a more limited and more
reasonable construction. In this context a short reference to the history of the
statute may be helpful. The original enactment of 1892 contained no provisions closely analogous to sections 1(r)(x) and 5(1)(g). In 1896, however,
with the wholesale incorporation 25 of provisions modelled on those of the
Finance Act, 1894 of the United Kingdom, the concept of property passing
24 [1946] Ex. C.R.
253.O. 1896, c. 5.
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on death was introduced into the statute. Included among the categories
of property deemed to pass on death was property passing under a settlement
which reserved an interest to the deceased during his lifetime and a provision
similar to section 5(1)(g) but in the positive or recapturing form. The first of
these provisions has remained in the statute throughout its history and now
appears as section 1(r)(x). The second remained in the Statute until 1937.
In 1919 an exempting provision in terms somewhat similar to section
5(1)(g) was inserted into the Act26 This exemption was however limited to
gifts in favour of specified relatives. Thus from 1919 until 1937 the Act
contained a provision in substance identical to section 1(r)(x), a recapturing
provision similar to those considered in the English and Privy Council cases
and a very limited exempting provision which required the assumption of
possession by the donee to the exclusion of the donor or of any benefit to him.
In 1937 the basic structure of the charging provision of the Act was
changed and for the first time the duty was imposed upon "dispositions". 27
At the same time the elaborate definition of a disposition was enacted, the
recapturing provision which spoke of assumption of possession by the donee
and the exclusion of the donor was removed and replaced with a provision
which recaptured dispositions of property situate in Ontario in certain circumstances and the exempting provision was changed so that it now referred to
"dispositions" rather than "gifts". The scope of the exemption was extended
so that it applied to any members of the deceased's family and not simply to
the relatives formerly specified.
In 1939 an exemption in similar terms was conferred upon dispositions
made to other persons more than thirty years prior to the deceased's death.28
When, in 1946, the period was reduced to five years the provision which
exempted dispositions in favour of relatives became redundant and was
repealed.29
As the application of the exemption to "dispositions" was effected in
1937 as one part of a package of amendments which introduced the concept
of a disposition into both the charging section and the categories of property
which is deemed to pass on death, it would not be unreasonable to allow
this fact to affect the construction of 5(l)(g). On this basis and in the light
of the considerations mentioned earlier in this paper the provision might well
be interpreted as confined to dispositions which can only attract tax as such.
Such an interpretation would prevent the emergence of a substantial
gap in the recapturing sections of the Act by allowing section 1(r)(x) to have
the effect it was obviously intended to have. At the same time such an interpretation would in no way unduly restrict the operation of section 5(l)(g).
The scheme of most death tax statutes in common law jurisdictions is that
the subject matter of inter vivos dispositions is recaptured if life interests are
reserved by the settlor or if, although nothing is reserved in the disposition,
26S.O.
27 S.O.
28 S.O.
29 S.O.

1919, c. 9.
1937, c. 3, s. 7.
1939 (2nd Sess.), c. 1.
1946, c. 90.
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the settlor subsequently obtains some benefit from the subject matter. It is
submitted that despite the wide terms of the definition of the term "disposition"3 0 a similar construction of the Succession Duty Act is not precluded.
The general thrust of the above comments is that the history and structure of the legislation in force in Ontario requires a much more limited interpretation of section 5(1)(g) than that adopted in Re McCreath. If, however,
those comments are misconceived there would still appear to be tenable arguments which, if accepted, would have led to the dismissal of the appeal.
It has been seen that the learned Judge drew a crucial distinction between
the income and capital interests in the trust.31 Once the deceased was held to
have been excluded from the latter, it was immaterial that she had received
some benefit from the former. This conclusion depends entirely on the proposition that the deceased's "interest" as a member of the class of income
beneficiaries was to be characterized as a beneficial proprietary interest for
the purposes of section 5(l)(g). If that proposition were rejected then on the
authority of Privy Council decisions it is clear that, by her receipt of income,
would have obtained a benefit from property of which she had
the deceased
32
disposed.
It is submitted that for the purposes of section 5(1)(g) the interest of a
beneficiary under exhaustive or non-exhaustive discretionary trusts of income
should not be characterized as a beneficial interest in the property and that
the distinction drawn in Gartside between the concept of an interest for the
purposes of different provisions in legislation of the United Kingdom is equally
applicable to the Succession Duty Act. In that case the House of Lords recognized that the mischief at which provisions analogous to section l(r)(x) were
directed required an extension of the concept beyond a "narrow or technical
meaning". 33 There would seem to be no reason of authority, principle or policy
for adopting this extended concept of an interest for the interpretation of
section 5(l)(g). It is true that in the first part of his reasons for judgment
Fraser 3. distinguished the decision of the House of Lords in Gartside on the
ground that the trustees in that case were under no obligation to distribute
any income to the beneficiaries whereas the trustee in Re McCreath, on the
other hand, had no power to accumulate income. That distinction has been
rejected in English cases to which the learned Judge did not refer and it has
been held that the reasoning in Gartside is as applicable to an exhaustive
discretionary trust as34 it is to a trust under which the trustees are entitled to
accumulate income.
30 The definition in s. 1 specifically includes dispositions made by the creation of a
trust: s. l(g) (x).
81 See text, supra, at p. 319.
32
See Commissioner of Stamp Duties of New South Wales v. The PermanentTrustee
Co. Ltd., [1956] A.C. 512 (P.C.); Oakes v. Commissioner of Stamp Duties of New South
Wales, supra, note 14.
33 Gartside and Another v. LR.C., supra, note 10 at 612. See also In re Coleman
(1888), 39 Ch.D. 443 at 452 (C.A.); In re Munro's Settlement Trusts, [1963] 1 W.L.R.
145 at 148-49. (Ch.D.).
34See Re Weirs Settlement Trusts, [1971] Ch. 145 (C.A.); Sainsbury v. I.R.C.,
[1970] Ch.712.
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The first limb of the statutory definition of the term "disposition" is as
follows:
"disposition" means,
(i) any means whereby any property passes or is agreed to be passed, directly or
.35
indirectly, from the deceased during his lifetime to any person, ...

At the time of the creation of the trust in Re McCreath the entire control of
the property passed from the settlor to the trustee. The former retained no
right to demand any part of the capital or income. Any income she received
came to her exclusively as a result of the decision of the trustee. In these
circumstances it can be argued that there are sufficient grounds to justify a
conclusion that, for the purposes of a taxing Act, the entire property in both
the capital and income of the trust passed from the settlor to the trustee.
If the above argument is also misconceived one might still wonder why,
in Re McCreath, no significance was given to the deceased's retention of a
testamentary power of appointment over the corpus of the trust. At the
creation of the trust, contingent interests in remainder passed to the deceased's
issue. Those interests were, as the learned Judge recognized, property of
which the deceased had disposed. Thereafter, although she received no benefit
from those interests, she retained the power to divest the interests of some
members of the class and to alter the proportions in which particular members
would ultimately share in the corpus. Such a power of appointment is not
normally regarded as a beneficial interest in property. 36 In these circumstances
can it be said that, from the creation of the trust, the deceased was excluded
from the property interests which had passed to her issue? On the previous
cases it is clear that the provision contains two limbs and that exclusion from
benefit and exclusion from the property are two distinct requirements. 37 It
seems reasonable to assume that the purpose of the provision is to exempt
dispositions of property which passes completely out of the control of the
settlor.38 On this basis the deceased was clearly not excluded. 38
This submission is supported by a recent decision of Wilson C.J.S.C. in
the Supreme Court of British Columbia. In Burns v. The Queen39 one
question was whether trust property, over which the settlor had retained a
power of appointment similar to that retained in Re McCreath, was
property taken under any grant or gift, whenever made, of which property bona

fide possession and enjoyment has not been assumed by the donee immediately
upon the grant or gift, and thenceforward retained to the entire exclusion of the
donor.... 40
35 Section
36

1(g) (i).
Commissioner of Stamp Duties of New South Wales v. Stephen, [1904] A.C. 137

(P.C.); O'Grady v. Wilmot, [1916] 2 A.C. 231 (H.L.) at 370-73, per Lord Summer.

37
See, in particular, Chick v. Commissioner of Stamp Duties of New South Wales,
supra, note 14.
38
Unless, possibly, the settlor's control is exercized in a fiduciary capacity: see Oakes
v. Commissionerof Stamp Duties, supra, note 14 and contrast A.-G. for Alberta v. Cowan,
[1926] 1D.L.R. 29 (S.C.C.).
38a See the remarks of Lord Blanesburgh in A.-G. v. Adamson, [1932] All E.R. 159,
at 165 (H.L.).
39 [1972] 4 W.W.R. 328 (B.C.S.C.).
40 Succession Duty Act, R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 372, s. 2(2) (c).

